What is interesting about the decision is its implications for a substantive legitimate expectations doctrine, here developed curiously enough not through admin law, but rather through CR law. 

[127] ... On the basis of the facts established at trial, which are consistent with the evidence available to the Minister at the relevant time, I conclude that the Minister’s refusal to grant Insite a s. 56 exemption was arbitrary and grossly disproportionate in its effects, and hence not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.

[128] As noted above, the Minister, when exercising his discretion under s. 56, must respect the rights guaranteed by the Charter. This means that, where s. 7 rights are at stake, any limitations imposed by ministerial decision must be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The Minister cannot simply deny an application for a s. 56 exemption on the basis of policy simpliciter; insofar as it affects Charter rights, his decision must accord with the principles of fundamental justice.

A change of policy alone cannot override a legitimate expectation that, absent any other actual change of circumstances, an official authorisation will be renewed. The LE confers an actual positive right to the thing expected (license), not merely a procedural one (in line with say Mavi, Moreau-Berube, and CUPE v Ont Lab).

Or then again maybe it's too early on a Mon for deep thoughts.

And on the issue of a sore lack of deep thought, hey Reg, what "power grab"?  (Tip: Read judgment first before attempting evasion.)